University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 47

Number 2

Article 8

5-1-2022

The Ethics and Economics of Social Equity in the Cannabis
Industry: Making a "Compelling" Case for Constitutional,
Impactful, and Sustainable Inclusivity Programs in Ohio and
beyond
Lauren Devine
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Devine, Lauren (2022) "The Ethics and Economics of Social Equity in the Cannabis Industry: Making a
"Compelling" Case for Constitutional, Impactful, and Sustainable Inclusivity Programs in Ohio and beyond,"
University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 47: No. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

The Ethics and Economics of Social Equity in the Cannabis Industry: Making a
"Compelling" Case for Constitutional, Impactful, and Sustainable Inclusivity
Programs in Ohio and beyond
Cover Page Footnote
Thank you to my Comment Advisor, Angel Hierrezuelo, for his constructive feedback. Additionally, thank
you to my faculty advisors, Professors Ericka Curran and Christopher Roederer, for their guidance in
focusing my research and challenging me to think more critically about what a successful social equity
program might look like. Further, thanks to those who have been working and advocating for equity in this
industry—most specifically, to my mentors, advisors, and colleagues, Dr. Tiffany Bowden and Ms. Rachael
Ardanuy, Esq.—for their support and contributions to this Comment based on personal experiences and
respective expertise. Next, thanks to my family and friends for their love and support. Finally, thank you to
Brendan for being a constant sounding board and for providing love, support, companionship,
compassion, and all the other things I have needed to do this work and to be a human, generally.

This comment is available in University of Dayton Law Review: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/8

THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL
EQUITY IN THE CANNABIS INDUSTRY:
MAKING A “COMPELLING” CASE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL, IMPACTFUL, AND
SUSTAINABLE INCLUSIVITY PROGRAMS IN
OHIO AND BEYOND
Lauren Devine*

I.
II.

III.

*

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 342
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BIASED
UNDERPINNINGS OF CANNABIS REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES .................................................................................................... 345
A. Early Twentieth Century Prohibition by the States ............................ 345
B. The Marijuana Tax Act and Federal Prohibition................................ 345
C. 1960–80s: The Nixon Administration, “The War on Drugs,” and “Just
Say No” .............................................................................................. 346
D. The Intersection of Racism, Cannabis Prohibition, and Discriminatory
Impact................................................................................................. 349
E. Disparate Economic Impact ............................................................... 349
F. Decriminalization and Legalization ................................................... 350
ANALYSIS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF STATES’
SOCIAL EQUITY PROGRAMS FOR CANNABIS BUSINESSES........ 352
A. The Good: Legal, Impactful, and Sustainable Social Equity Programs
that Promote Industry Inclusion Based on Disadvantageous Past Life
Experiences ........................................................................................ 353
1. Massachusetts ............................................................................... 353
2. Illinois ........................................................................................... 356
B. The Bad: Ineffective and Unconstitutional Programs ........................ 357
1. Ohio .............................................................................................. 357
2. Colorado ....................................................................................... 358
C. The Ugly: Hard Truths and Important Takeaways from the Current
Landscape of Social Equity within the Cannabis Industry ................. 360
1. Expectations vs. Reality ................................................................ 360
2. Providing Opportunity vs. Predatory Opportunism ...................... 361

J.D., University of Dayton School of Law, cum laude; President, UDSL Cannabis Law Society; B.F.A.,
Syracuse University, magna cum laude. Thank you to my Comment Advisor, Angel Hierrezuelo, for his
constructive feedback. Additionally, thank you to my faculty advisors, Professors Ericka Curran and
Christopher Roederer, for their guidance in focusing my research and challenging me to think more
critically about what a successful social equity program might look like. Further, thanks to those who have
been working and advocating for equity in this industry—most specifically, to my mentors, advisors, and
colleagues, Dr. Tiffany Bowden and Ms. Rachael Ardanuy, Esq.—for their support and contributions to
this Comment based on personal experiences and respective expertise. Next, thanks to my family and
friends for their love and support. Finally, thank you to Brendan, for being a constant sounding board and
for providing love, support, companionship, compassion, and all the other things I have needed to do this
work and to be a human, generally.

Published by eCommons, 2022

342

IV.

V.

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

3. A Colorblind Eye Turned on Impact and Sustainability ............... 362
A PROPOSAL FOR OHIO AND BEYOND ............................................. 362
A. Creating a “strong basis in evidence” by conducting demographic
research and impact studies. ............................................................... 363
B. Developing a “narrowly tailored,” multi-faceted qualification structure.
......................................................................................... 364
C. Providing evidence of a “compelling government interest” by clearly
defining, monitoring, and implementing measures for sustainability. 364
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 367

“Inclusion is not a matter of political correctness. It is the key to growth.”
Rev. Jesse Jackson1

I. INTRODUCTION
When the Ohio legislature legalized medical marijuana with House
Bill 523 on September 8, 2016, the language of chapter 3796 of the Ohio
Revised Code “instructed [the] Ohio Department of Commerce to issue
certain licenses to medical marijuana cultivators, processors, and testing
laboratories.”2 Within the enumerated criteria by which licenses could be
awarded, chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio Revised Code further directed the
department to issue at least fifteen percent of cannabis business licenses
“to entities that are owned and controlled by . . . members of one of the
following economically disadvantaged groups: Blacks or African Americans,
American Indians, Hispanics or Latinos, and Asians.”3 Within the context of
the section, “owned and controlled” meant “that at least fifty-one per cent of
the business, including corporate stock,” was owned by “persons” belonging
to one or more of the listed racially distinct groups; and that person had
“control over the management and day-to-day operations of the business and
an interest in the capital, assets, and profits and losses of the business
proportionate to their percentage of ownership.”4
This provision presumptively arose out of the department’s attempt
to promote social equity—that is—“justice and fairness within social policy”
as the nascent medical marijuana program was implemented.5 Such programs
1
Jesse Jackson Quotations, QUOTE TAB, https://www.quotetab.com/quotes/by-jesse-jackson/4
(last visited May 30, 2022).
2
Pharmacann Ohio, LLC, v. Ohio Dept. Com. Dir. Jacqueline T. Williams, No. 17-CV-10962,
2018 WL 7500067, at *3 (Ohio Com. Pl. Nov. 15, 2018); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.09(C).
3
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.09(C).
4
Id.
5
Robert Hoban, The Critical Importance Of Social Equity In The Cannabis Industry, FORBES
(Aug. 31, 2020, 8:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthoban/2020/08/31/the-critical-importanceof-social-equity-in-the-cannabis-industry/.
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typically aim to “ensure that people of color, and those with marijuana
offenses prior to legalization” have equitable access to the “opportunity to
participate, meaningfully,” in the “burgeoning” cannabis industry; however,
Ohio’s initial effort to leverage chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio Revised Code
to ensure inclusivity was ultimately meaningless.6 Even though many
applicants who qualified under the “economically disadvantaged group”
specification had already relied on this provision in deciding to pursue
licensure, the provision was tossed out before all licenses could be awarded.7
On November 15, 2018, a state trial judge presiding over the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas held that chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio
Revised Code was “unconstitutional on its face pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.”8 Essentially, “Ohio’s use
of racial preferences in the award of state medical marijuana cultivation
licenses violated the Equal Protection Clause[s]” of the United States and the
Ohio Constitutions.9 In its defense, the Ohio Department of Commerce
argued there was a “compelling government interest in redressing past and
present effects of racial discrimination . . . where the State itself was
involved.”10 However, the court reasoned that there was “not a strong basis
in evidence supporting the . . . conclusion that remedial action [was] necessary
to correct discrimination within the medical marijuana industry.”11
The court’s reasoning in Pharmacann begs the question: what would
substantiate a “strong basis in evidence” that it is “necessary” to correct the
wrongful discrimination that proliferates the medical marijuana industry?
Due to the decades of complete cannabis prohibition that existed in the United
States until the late 1990s to the early 2010s, it seems naive that the court did
not factor the relatively brief history of the legal, regulated cannabis industry
into its rationale. Objectively, how could the government have presented
6

Id.
This information was learned by the author through personal experience in dealing with cannabis
business applicant clients in Ohio.
8
Pharmacann Ohio, LLC, v. Ohio Dept. Com. Dir. Jacqueline T. Williams, No. 17-CV-10962,
2018 WL 7500067, at *3 (Ohio Com. Pl. Nov. 15, 2018).
In December 2017, Plaintiff . . . received a final [application] score that would have
otherwise qualified it to receive one of the twelve provisional [medical marijuana
cultivation] licenses. Yet, Plaintiff was denied a provisional license, while
Defendants Harvest Grows, LLC, and Parma Wellness Center, LLC, were awarded
provisional licenses due to the control of the defendant companies by one or more
members of an economically disadvantaged group, as described in R.C.
§3796.09(C). On June 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed its intervening complaint, seeking
equal protection under the law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Article I, Section 2
of the Ohio Constitution.
Id. at *1 (citations omitted).
9
Robert Mikos, UPDATE: State Judge Holds Use of Race in Ohio Medical Marijuana
Licensing Unconstitutional, VANDERBILT U.: MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, AND AUTH. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/11/update-state-judge-holds-ohio-medical-marijuanalicensing-system-unconstitutional/.
10
Pharmacann, 2018 WL 7500067, at *4.
11
Id. at *6.
7

Published by eCommons, 2022

344

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

a “strong basis in evidence” when that evidence was drawn from an industry
that was merely in its infancy in Ohio and in other states and had only existed
for a few decades, at most? As this Comment will discuss, there is no lack of
evidence to substantiate the history of discrimination and disproportionate
economic harm done to members of the disadvantaged groups identified in
chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio Revised Code and other marginalized groups
due to the failed War on Drugs.12 But, in light of the court’s ruling in
Pharmacann, it seems clear that an effective social equity program must be
based on qualifications and criteria beyond solely those which could come
under the “strict scrutiny” standard of review, like race.13
Despite the shortcomings of chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio Revised
Code and the impotence of most other states’ social equity programs, with
enough research-driven resolve, Ohio and other states can effectively
implement a social equity program that is inclusive, impactful, and legally
sound. Using the constitutional issues that arose in Pharmacann as
a springboard, this Comment examines social equity and inclusion programs
that have emerged with the evolving cannabis industry in three sections.
Section I provides background for this Comment in an overview of the history
of cannabis regulation in the United States and its entanglement with
socioeconomic and race-based discrimination. Section II analyzes and
evaluates various states’ social equity and inclusion programs within the
cannabis industry, and Section III proposes a legal, effective, and sustainable
model for a cannabis social equity program that Ohio—and other states—
could adopt. Finally, Section IV provides a conclusion for the assertions
made throughout.

12
For a more in-depth discussion of the intersectionality of discrimination, cannabis prohibition,
criminalization, and disparate economic impact, see generally Mathew Swinburne & Kathleen Hoke, State
Efforts to Create an Inclusive Marijuana Industry in the Shadow of the Unjust War on Drugs, 15 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 235 (2020); Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the Hope for
Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789 (2019); Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and
Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689 (2016); David V. Patton, A History of United States Cannabis Law,
34 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (2020); and Florence Shu-Acquaye, Medical Marijuana: Implications of Evolving
Trends in Regulation, 46 U. DAYTON L. REV. 25 (2020).
13
“Strict scrutiny” evolved out of a footnote in the 1938 Carolene Products Co. case and is the highest
and most stringent standard of judicial review that courts apply in cases where the question is whether
a constitutional right, such as equal protection, should be waived in order to serve the government’s
interest. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”); see also Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that
schools can address diversity concerns and “bring[] together students of diverse backgrounds and races
through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on
a classification . . . defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible.”). Kennedy’s concurrence in Seattle Schools suggests that race-conscious laws may not be
subject to strict scrutiny when considered in totality with several other factors. Id. at 798.
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BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BIASED
UNDERPINNINGS OF CANNABIS REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Early Twentieth Century Prohibition by the States
In the early twentieth century in the United States, social perception
of cannabis and its applications began to shift significantly.14 While hemp
fibers and cannabis extracts had been widely used for textiles and their
medicinal efficacy in treating a plethora of ailments, smoking cannabis as
a recreational activity was not introduced into American culture until the early
decades of the 1900s.15 Immigrants to the United States who sought refuge
during the conflict of the Mexican Revolution brought with them the “practice
of smoking marijuana leaf in cigarettes or pipes,” and soon, the use of the
Spanish-derived word “marijuana” increased as the “preferred . . . more exotic
alternative to the familiar words hemp and cannabis.”16 Compounded by the
subsequent social unrest and mass unemployment that occurred during the
Great Depression, the association of immigrants with recreational cannabis
smoking led to cannabis prohibition legislation, which stemmed from
“anti-Mexican xenophobia.”17 At this time, concurrent with the onset of
alcohol prohibition, anti-marijuana laws were seemingly “uncontroversial”
and “between 1914 and 1925, twenty-six states passed laws prohibiting the
plant . . . [without] public outcry or even legislative debate.”18
B. The Marijuana Tax Act and Federal Prohibition
The movement toward federal prohibition began in the early 1930s
after a prominent New Orleans doctor blamed a string of robberies on
“‘muggle-heads’—as pot smokers were called” at the time.19 The media and
law enforcement alike demonized cannabis use with sensationalized
depictions of addicted schoolchildren and stories of “killers . . . smok[ing]
cannabis to ready themselves for murder and mayhem.”20 Led by the
infamously racist Harry Jacob Anslinger, an appeal to Congress was made for

14
See generally Stephen Siff, The Illegalization of Marijuana: A Brief History, ORIGINS: CURRENT
EVENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (May 2014), https://origins.osu.edu/article/illegalization-marijuanabrief-history.
15
See, e.g., Id.; Marijuana, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/crime/history-of-marijuana
(Oct. 10, 2019); Marijuana Timeline, PBS: FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
dope/etc/cron.html (last visited May 30, 2022).
16
Siff, supra note 14; Historical Timeline: History of Marijuana as Medicine—2900 BC to Present,
BRITANNICA: PROCON.ORG, https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/historical-timeline/ (May 12, 2022).
17
See Siff, supra note 14.
18
Id.
19
Brent Staples, The Federal Marijuana Ban Is Rooted in Myth and Xenophobia, N.Y. TIMES (July
29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/high-time-federal-marijuana-ban-is-rooted-inmyth.html.
20
Id.
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federal prohibition.21 At the time, Anslinger and others wrongly argued that
cannabis “caused insanity[,]. . . pushed people toward horrendous acts of
criminality[,] . . . [and] was fiercely addictive.”22 Apparently swayed by this
narrative, Congress enacted The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, “the first federal
[United States] law to criminalize marijuana nationwide.”23 After the Act’s
passage, hemp for industrial purposes became the only authorized use of
cannabis.24
Cultivation of industrial hemp continued through World War II and
into the 1950s.25 Despite testimony made by a reputable researcher during
a 1951 effort to re-examine and walk back Congress’s restrictions on
cannabis, surprisingly stricter measures ensued.26 Even though cannabis was
no longer perceived as addictive, it was instead relabeled as a “gateway drug”
and “a ‘steppingstone’ to heroin addiction,” setting the social narrative that
would pave the way for the “War on Drugs,” discussed further herein.27
C. 1960–80s: The Nixon Administration, “The War on Drugs,” and
“Just Say No”
In the 1960s, social perception of cannabis shifted, with the image of
stereotypical cannabis smokers changing from racial minorities to white
college students.28 Youths of the 1960s seemed primed to rebel against the
more conservative values of prior generations, as they were fueled by
opposition to the War in Vietnam, an appreciation of free-thinking music,
21
Id.; Laura Smith, How a racist hate-monger masterminded America’s War on Drugs, TIMELINE
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://timeline.com/harry-anslinger-racist-war-on-drugs-prison-industrial-complexfb5cbc281189; Robert Solomon, Racism and Its Effect on Cannabis Research, 5 CANNABIS CANNABINOID
RSCH., no. 1, 2020, at 2–3.
22
Staples, supra note 19.
23
Id.; Marijuana, supra note 15.
24
Marijuana, supra note 15. “Hemp” and “cannabis,” though referred to in different colloquial terms
and commonly thought of as different plant species, are in actuality two names for the same plant for the
“Cannaceae family.” Sian Ferguson, Hemp vs. Marijuana: What’s the Difference?, HEALTHLINE
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/hemp-vs-marijuana. The distinction is a solely legal
one, based respectively on the tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) content of the flowers. Id. “THC is one of
many cannabinoids, or chemicals found in the cannabis plant . . . primarily responsible for the ‘high’
associated with cannabis.” Id. Because THC content varies among cannabis plants with some strains bred
to be more potent than others, legally, “hemp” refers to “cannabis that contains 0.3 percent or less THC
content by dry weight” while “marijuana” or “cannabis” refers to cannabis that has more than 0.3 percent
THC by dry weight.” Id. “Hemp” grows very quickly and is therefore a useful and sustainable plant for
producing industrial products such as textiles, animal feed, plastics, paper, clothing, and food products. Id.
25
Marijuana, supra note 15.
26
Staples, supra note 19. “Dr. Harris Isbell, director of research at the Public Health Service Hospital
in Lexington, Ky., disputed the insanity, crime and addiction theories, telling Congress that ‘smoking
marijuana has no unpleasant aftereffects, no dependence is developed on the drug, and the practice can
easily be stopped at any time.’” Id.
27
See Marijuana, supra note 15; Staples, supra note 19. For a discussion on “The War on Drugs”
itself, see Bryan Mann, The Drug Laws That Changed How We Punish, NPR (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:04 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish (discussing the
creation and enforcement of “draconian” drug laws disproportionately impacted (and continues to impact)
American minority communities and represents the effect of the systemic injustice these policies represent
and what current social equity initiatives attempt to remedy).
28
See Siff, supra note 14; Staples, supra note 19.
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the “hippie” counter-culture, and “the freedom born from an excess of
material wealth and time.”29 Smoking cannabis seemed harmless and fun to
youths of the time, who were realizing that the laws and penalties against
it were disproportionately severe.30 As the use of cannabis on college
campuses reached seemingly “epidemic” proportions by the mid-1960s,
prohibitionists and legislators alike suddenly questioned punishing young,
white, middle-class college students with the same harsh penalties that
applied to minorities.31
Nixon effectively “exploited and perpetuated white resentment over
integration and civil rights” by linking drugs and crime to poor communities
and minorities.32 Amidst political pressure and discord, the Nixon
administration signed the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.33 The Act
effectively repealed the Marijuana Tax Act and listed cannabis as a Schedule
I narcotic alongside drugs such as heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (more
commonly known as LSD or acid), and ecstasy, deemed to have “no medical
use and a high potential for abuse.”34 Between 1965 and 1970, while “hippie
activists [and the] mainstream voices of Life, Newsweek, and Look magazines
questioned why the plant was illegal at all,” cannabis-related arrests at the
state level “increased tenfold.”35 Horrifyingly, this effect was seemingly
intentional or at least foreseen by some in power within the Nixon
administration.36 John Ehrlichman, a former domestic policy chief for Nixon,
stated in a 2016 interview, “We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either
against the [Vietnam] war or black, but by getting the public to associate the
hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both
heavily, we could disrupt those communities.”37
Conflicting views persisted into the mid-1970s; anti-drug programs
like Drug Abuse Resistance Education, better known as “D.A.R.E.,” labeled
cannabis a “gateway drug,” while the Nixon administration willfully ignored
a report prepared by The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug
Abuse that concluded that “the actual and potential harm of use of the drug is

29

Siff, supra note 14.
Id.
31
Id.; Staples, supra note 19.
32
Katharine Neill Harris & William Martin, Persistent Inequities in Cannabis Policy, 60 JUDGES’ J.,
no. 1, Winter 2021, at 9, 10.
33
See Marijuana, supra note 15; Siff, supra note 14.
34
21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (the most updated version of the CSA, relating to schedules of controlled
substances); Marijuana, supra note 15.
35
Siff, supra note 14.
36
See Harris & Martin, supra note 32.
37
Id. (quoting Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG.
(Apr. 2016), https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all).
30
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not great enough to justify intrusion by the criminal law into private behavior,
a step which our society takes only with the greatest reluctance.”38
This was a pivotal time in the history of cannabis criminalization and
“drug” criminalization, more generally.39 For example, harsh laws backed by
New York’s Republican governor, Norman Rockefeller, in the 1970s had an
“unexpected and troubling” impact.40 After the passage of the sentencing
laws, New York prosecutors began to notice that although “[w]hite people
were using a lot of drugs . . . and committing a lot of crimes . . . the people
being arrested and sent to prison under the Rockefeller laws came almost
entirely from poor black and Hispanic neighborhoods.”41 The spread of these
harsh laws and accompanying sentences led to a massive spike in the
incarcerated population in America, the impact of which was
disproportionately felt by minorities and poor communities, mainly people of
color.42 Furthermore, in 1973, the formation of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) gave rise to the “law enforcement orientation toward
cannabis policy . . . .”43
The persistent anti-cannabis legislation of the Nixon administration
was followed by a brief softening during the Carter administration until
Reagan’s presidency.44 “Reagan had opposed decriminalization of marijuana
as governor of California and, as president, showed no sympathy for drug use
or users.”45 During the 1980s, amidst fear of dissent against “law and order”
and the rise of crack cocaine use, Congress passed multiple pieces of punitive
anti-drug legislation.46 The Reagan administration further promoted “drug
testing to ensure that schools and workplaces remained ‘drug-free’. . . [and]
spearheaded an extensive anti-drug media campaign.”47 As part of this
campaign, First Lady Nancy Reagan unveiled her “Just Say No” slogan that
would proliferate at anti-drug rallies, in public service announcements, on
38
NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIJUANA & DRUG ABUSE, REP. NO. 1: MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 176 (1972), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/nc/
ncmenu.htm; see Siff, supra note 14; Staples, supra note 19.
39
See Mann, supra note 27.
40
Id. (“Rockefeller launched his campaign to toughen New York’s laws at a press conference in
January 1973 . . . call[ing] for something unheard of: mandatory prison sentences of 15 years to life for
drug dealers and addicts—even those caught with small amounts of [cannabis], cocaine or heroin.”).
41
Id.
42
See id.; Charlotte Resing, Marijuana Legalization Is a Racial Justice Issue, AM. C.L. UNION (Apr.
20, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/drug-law-reform/marijuanalegalization-racial-justice-issue; 1 LAST PRISONER PROJECT, CRIMINAL-INJUSTICE: CANNABIS & THE RISE
OF THE CARCERAL STATE (2020) https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/08efa45c/files/uploaded/CriminalInjustice%3B%20Cannabis%20%26%20The%20Rise%20of%20the%20Carceral%20StatePart%201%3B%20Policing.pdf.
43
Patton, supra note 12, at 14.
44
Siff, supra note 14 (“By 1977, the use of the drug seemed so commonplace and the fears so archaic
that President Jimmy Carter called for the decriminalization of marijuana. As Carter pointed out in
a message to Congress in 1977, anti-marijuana laws cause more harm to marijuana users than the drug
itself.”).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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billboards, and on talk shows.48 This slogan, along with the D.A.R.E.
program and the 1985 “[t]his is your brain on drugs” public service
advertisement, would run for years to come.49
D. The Intersection of Racism, Cannabis Prohibition, and
Discriminatory Impact
Stemming from the highly punitive legislation and the newly formed
DEA, policing of cannabis-related crimes changed significantly over the
course of the 1980–90s.50 Societal tensions surrounding the stigma of
cannabis use increased proportionately with incidents of hostile interactions
between the police and certain communities, particularly poor and minority
communities.51 Indeed, “[d]rug-related enforcement is one, if not the, biggest
drivers of police harassment, misconduct, and violence in America.”52
And, as mentioned in the foregoing discussion, “Black and Latinx
communities bear the overwhelming brunt of cannabis-related enforcement
and the harassment and police brutality it entails.”53 This disparate level of
enforcement persists despite white people being just as likely to consume
cannabis as non-white people.54 “These racial disparities are . . . [seemingly]
by design . . . born out of an explicit desire to maintain social control over
America’s communities of color.”55
E. Disparate Economic Impact
The disproportionate and disparate effect of cannabis and drug
criminalization on communities of color creates a particularly oppressive
rippling effect that can be felt economically for generations.56 This is because
a “[c]onviction for a drug offense can have serious consequences,” especially
in states where cannabis is still prohibited.57 Students can face expulsion or
revocation of a scholarship, parents can lose custody of a child, and lowincome, disabled, or indigent individuals may be barred from obtaining
subsidized housing.58 And while administrative practices currently protect
patients from losing benefits due to cannabis use, veterans or Medicaid
48

Id.
Id.
50
See LAST PRISONER PROJECT, supra note 42, 19–20.
51
Id. at 32.
52
Id. at 7.
53
Id. at 8.
54
Id.
55
Id.; see also Harris & Martin, supra note 32, at 10 (“Cannabis use rates are roughly equivalent
across racial groups, yet Black people on average are 3.64 times more likely to be arrested for possession,
a disparity that has remained constant since 2010 . . . [and] increased in 31 states between 2010 and 2018.”).
56
See generally LAST PRISONER PROJECT, supra note 42, at 8.
57
Harris & Martin, supra note 32, at 11.
58
Id. See generally Laura M. Borgelt, Considerations for Hospital Policies Regarding Medical
Cannabis Use, 52 Hosp Pharm. 89–90, Feb. 2017; Marijuana Use and Your Social Security Disability
Claim, PARMELE L. FIRM, https://parmelelawfirm.com/blog/social-security/marijuana-use-and-yoursocial-security-disability-claim/ (last visited May 30, 2022).
49
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benefits do not cover medical use of cannabis.59 Virtually everywhere,
a criminal record of any kind can make it extremely difficult to obtain
employment.60 Given the disparate nature of “drug” enforcement, “[i]t would
be naive not to think this would . . . [put people of color at a] greater
disadvantage” than white people.61 The foregoing discussion sheds light on
how a number of factors have contributed to inequities in the economic
landscape, especially for minorities.
F. Decriminalization and Legalization
Currently, a majority of states have adopted some type of evolved cannabis
policy that reflects a view of either decriminalization or legalization. 62
Legalization and decriminalization are often used interchangeably, but they
have very different meanings and implications.63 “Decriminalization is the
act of removing criminal sanctions against an act, article, or behavior,” this
means that when a state decriminalizes cannabis, it remains illegal, but the
legal system does not prosecute low-level crimes such as minor possession.64
In contrast, legalization of cannabis removes all legal prohibitions, meaning
that licensed cannabis businesses can operate and adults can “purchase and
use [it] at will, similar to tobacco and alcohol.”65 With the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996, California became the first state to legalize marijuana for
medicinal use by people with severe or chronic illnesses.66 Between 1996 and
2012, sixteen states followed suit and legalized it for similar medical purposes
only.67 In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize
cannabis for recreational use.68

59
Id. See generally Patrick McNight, Veterans Struggle to Gain Access to Medical Marijuana, 12
Nat’l. L. Rev., no.291, Oct. 2019; Mike Woods, Will I Lose My VA Disability Benefits If I Use Marijuana?,
WOODS & WOODS, https://www.woodslawyers.com/marijuana-va-disability/ (Apr. 4, 2022).
60
Harris & Martin, supra note 32, at 11.
61
Id.
62
See State Policy, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/states/ (last visited
May 30, 2022) (outlining policy via interactive map).
63
See Dragan M. Svrakic et al., Legalization, Decriminalization & Medicinal Use of Cannabis:
A Scientific and Public Health Perspective, 109 MO. MED. 90, 90 (Mar./Apr. 2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6181739.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Marijuana, supra note 15.
67
See generally State-By-State Medical Marijuana Laws Report, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/assets/pdf/issues/medical-marijuana/State-by-State-Laws-Report-2015.pdf
(Dec. 2016).
68
Id. at 9. Keith Coffman & Nicole Neroulias, Colorado, Washington first states to legalize
recreational pot, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2012, 7:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuanalegalization/colorado-washington-first-states-to-legalize-recreational-pot-idUSBRE8A602D20121107.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/8

2022]

Social Equity in the Cannabis Industry

351

Figure 1

Notwithstanding that cannabis currently remains illegal under the
federal law of the United States, the evolving legal status among the states
has shifted to reflect that most Americans favor legalizing and regulating the
substance.69 While the onset of the state-regulated cannabis industry has
heralded a “green rush” of opportunity for many entrepreneurs, minorities and
other communities marginalized by the failed “War on Drugs” still face
obstacles and barriers blocking their entry to the market.70 Indeed, many
would-be cannabis business moguls are instead sitting in prison, incarcerated
for crimes that, depending on their zip code, may now be legal pursuant to the
laws of the state.71 Therefore, in order to achieve true diversity in the industry
and to right the wrongs of the injustice doled out by the failed “War on
Drugs,” effective social equity programs must be part of any future cannabis
69

State-By-State Medical Marijuana Laws Report, supra note 67, at app. D.
Id.; The Cannabis Green Rush: What Is It? Is It Over?; YAHOO: FINANCE (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/cannabis-green-rush-over-203410554.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk
=ma.
71
State-By-State Medical Marijuana Laws Report, supra note 67, at app. D; Jordan Winters,
Prison-to-pot farms confront legacy of war on drugs, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2022, 4:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/prison-pot-farms-confront-legacy-war-drugs-rcna18421.
70
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regulation. While there have been ongoing efforts at the federal level for
some reform, as of publication, there has been no federal relief for the
cannabis industry other than the amendments to the budgetary bills that
protect state commercial cannabis programs.72 Importantly, at the time of
writing, Ohio has yet to amend its existing Code or pass any new legislation
regarding social equity in the state’s cannabis industry.73
III.

ANALYSIS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF
STATES’ SOCIAL EQUITY PROGRAMS FOR
CANNABIS BUSINESSES

In an effort to make reparations for the troubling history of
discrimination and injustice surrounding the business of cannabis in America,
many states with developing regulated commercial cannabis programs have
attempted to establish social equity initiatives in some form.74 Such initiatives
typically address one or more categories of marginalized groups and
individuals who have been disenfranchised by: (1) past life experiences,
including criminal history and veteran status; (2) disadvantageous geographic
and socioeconomic circumstances; and (3) immutable characteristics such as
race, sexual orientation, and gender identity.75 Identifying as a member of
one of these groups during the application process usually translates to
calculating additional points on a competitively scored application for
a business license and/or gaining access to specialized resources that are
otherwise unavailable to a non-member applicant.76 The specific
qualifications, benefits, and operational logistics vary for each jurisdiction’s
social equity and inclusion program.77 The following discussion provides
a brief overview of the respective states’ social equity and inclusion program
72
See, e.g., Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019, S. 2227, 116th
Cong. § 3054(b); Iris Dorbian, Biden Administration Has Some Cannabis Professionals Feeling Hopeful
But Cautious, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2021, 9:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/
2021/01/27/new-bidenharris-administration-has-some-cannabis-professionals-feeling-hopeful-butcautious/; Lisa Rough, The Cole Memo: What Is It and What Does It Mean?, LEAFLY (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/what-is-the-cole-memo. The Cole Memo prevented federal funds
from being used to undermine legal states’ programs. Id.
73

Ohio: Equity Project State Briefing; MINORITY CANNABIS BUS. ASS’N, https://minoritycannabis.org/

equitymap/ohio/#:~:text=Social%20Equity%20Definition%20%2F%20Criteria,disproportionately%20ha
rmed%20by%20cannabis%20prohibition (Jan. 13, 2022).
74
See Comparison of State Cannabis Social Equity Provisions, NAT’L ASS’N CANNABIS BUS. (2020),
https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/2796535/Final%20NACB_Chart.pdf; Bart Schaneman, Illinois
social equity program flawed, advocates say, but it’s best in cannabis industry so far, MJBIZDAILY,
https://mjbizdaily.com/illinois-social-equity-program-flawed-advocates-say-but-it-is-best-in-cannabisindustry-so-far/ (Dec. 17, 2021); Hoban, supra note 5.
75
See Comparison of State Cannabis Social Equity Provisions, supra note 74; Priority Applications,
N.J.GOV: CANNABIS REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nj.gov/cannabis/businesses/priority-applications/ (last
viewed May 30, 2022); State Medical Marijuana Social Equity Plan Comparison, CANNABIS CONTROL
COMM’N
MASS.,
https://mass-cannabis-control.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Social-EquityCombined-Handout.pdf (last visited May 30, 2022).
76
For example, in the author’s experience consulting for business applicants in the cannabis industry,
states like Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Florida offered bonus points on the application and/or resources to
Social Equity applicants.
77
See Comparison of Social Equity Provisions, supra note 74.
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efforts, as well as an analysis of each program’s efficacy and what seems to
be working well.78
A. The Good: Legal, Impactful, and Sustainable Social Equity
Programs that Promote Industry Inclusion Based on
Disadvantageous Past Life Experiences
The following discussion explores why states that have potentially
implemented the most legally viable and impactful social equity programs
base the qualifications for inclusion in their programs on multi-faceted criteria
beyond just immutable characteristics.
Such programs have been
implemented by a few states and municipalities, including Massachusetts and
Illinois, discussed herein.79
1. Massachusetts
Massachusetts implemented its medical marijuana program in 2012
and its adult-use program in 2016.80 Only the adult-use program incorporated
a Social Equity Program (“SEP”) and an Economic Empowerment Priority
(“EEP”) for owners of commercial cannabis businesses, which arose “from
the requirement for the [Cannabis Control] Commission to ensure that people
from communities that have been disproportionately harmed by marijuana
law enforcement are included in the new legal marijuana industry, under
[Massachusetts state law].”81 Over the subsequent years, the SEP arrived at
its current iteration under the oversight of the Cannabis Control Commission
(“CCC”).82 The CCC purported that its purpose was to address equity in
Massachusetts’s regulated cannabis industry by providing various benefits to
“disproportionately harmed people [through the SEP], for businesses that
economically empower disproportionately harmed people [through the EEP],
and for minority-owned, women-owned, and veteran-owned businesses.”83
First, in order to qualify for participation in the SEP, applicants must
demonstrate at least one of the following criteria: “[applicant’s] income does
not exceed 400% of Area Median Income and residency in an Area of
Disproportionate Impact, as defined by the Commission, for at least five of
the past ten years”; they have a past drug conviction, and have been a resident
of Massachusetts for at least the preceding twelve months; or they have been
78
Id.; Christopher Nani, Social Equity Assessment Tool for the Cannabis Industry, OHIO S. J.
CRIM. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3312114.
79
See Comparison of State Cannabis Social Equity Provisions, supra note 74; Schaneman, supra
note 74; COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-10-103.
80
Policy: Massachusetts, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/states/massachusetts/
(June 22, 2021); Guidance on Equity Programs, CANNABIS CONTROL COMM’N MASS., https://masscannabis-control.com/wp-content/uploads/200825_Guidance_on_Equity_Programs.pdf (June 2020).
81
Id. at 1.
82
See generally Id.
83
Id. at 1.
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married to or are the child of a person with a drug conviction and the applicant
has been a resident of Massachusetts for at least the preceding year.84
While there are some restrictions regarding qualifying drug convictions, it
seems to have a great potential impact for individuals who have been directly
disadvantaged by a criminal record to now be able to find opportunity in the
cannabis industry arising from that record.85 In other words, the once illegal
nature of cannabis that led to an individual’s relatively minor drug conviction
can now, because cannabis is no longer illegal, provide an opportunity for that
individual to benefit and thrive. Additionally, the qualification criteria also
have a positive impact on familial legacy, in that the convictions that may
plague spouses and dependents of an applicant can also potentially benefit
them in obtaining marijuana business ownership.86
Finally,
the Massachusetts SEP qualification criteria apply to any person regardless of
race, sex, sexual orientation, and ethnicity.87 For these reasons, the SEP can
directly impact righting past wrongs and is available to those who were
directly affected by the failed “War on Drugs.”
Although the SEP is a “free, statewide, technical assistance and
training program that provides education, skill-based training, tools, and
licensing benefits for success in the cannabis industry for those most impacted
by the War on Drugs, marijuana prohibition, and disproportionate arrests and
incarceration,” it has its shortcomings.88 The program is “designed to give
participants the tools and training necessary to apply for and obtain a license
and the skills-based training for employment in the industry.”89 However,
the SEP does not address the disparity in the actual ability to access and utilize
the resources provided and, most importantly, “[c]ompletion of the program
does not guarantee licensure.”90 For example, many would-be applicants lack
access to computers and thus cannot access the SEP application nor
the training resources.91 Other obstacles include language and literacy

84

Id.; see also Comparison of State Cannabis Social Equity Provisions, supra note 74.
See generally 935 MASS. CODE REGS. § 500.801; Equity Programs, CANNABIS CONTROL COMM’N
MASS, https://masscannabiscontrol.com/equity-programs/#eligibility (last visited May 30, 2022).
For example, a license applicant cannot have been convicted of providing cannabis to a minor. Id.
86
Guidance on Equity Programs, supra note 80, at 2.
87
Id. at 1.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.; see infra note 91–92 and accompanying text.
91
This was learned through the author’s personal experience working with clients in the
Massachusetts SEP program. One client specifically explained that several participants could not access
computers, even at the public library, especially during the closures due to COVID-19. For more
discussion on the Cannabis Industry, see Travis Steffen, COVID-19’s Prolonged Impact on the Cannabis
Industry, CANNABIS BUS. EXEC. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.cannabisbusinessexecutive.com/2020/10/
covid-19s-prolonged-impact-on-the-cannabis-industry; infra note 103 and accompanying text.
85
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barriers that present similar challenges to some individuals who cannot fully
take advantage of the instructional materials.92
Separate from the SEP, the CCC also developed a prioritized review
system to accelerate the licensing decision process for communities targeted
for economic empowerment.93 Specifically, the program “prioritize[d]
review and licensing decisions for ‘applicants seeking retail, manufacturing,
or cultivation licenses who were able to demonstrate experience
in—or business practices that promote—economic empowerment in
disproportionately impacted communities.’”94 Finally, the CCC is “required
to track and pursue meaningful participation by minority, women, and veteran
business enterprises.”95 Although the benefits provided through the EEP and
to minority-, women-, and veteran-owned businesses are worth mentioning,
there is a potential that Massachusetts runs the risk of rendering its initiative
moot if—by including so many different classes of applicants—the program
is not sufficiently tailored to provide any real benefit to its participants.96
Massachusetts also provides another interesting benefit: “For at least
two years, Delivery Endorsements for microbusinesses[,] . . . Delivery-Only
Licenses, [and Social Consumption Licenses] will be limited exclusively to
businesses controlled by, and with majority ownership comprised of,
Certified Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants or SEP participants.”97
By creating this exclusivity, bigger businesses and investors are incentivized
to partner with EEP and SEP participants. In addition, these particular
licenses enjoy “[n]o application fees for license applications [and a] 50%
reduction in annual license fees.”98 The CCC explicitly states that the
foregoing benefits “are designed to reduce barriers to entry into the adult-use
marijuana industry.”99
So far, the program seems to be achieving its goals. The varied yet
tailored qualification criteria provide an avenue for entry for a significant
number of applicants; there are specifically designated license types
92
Additionally, one of the author’s clients explained that some participants face literacy and language
barriers, which can be especially detrimental to individuals for whom English is not their first language
when resources and materials are provided only in English.
93
Guidance on Equity Programs, supra note 80, at 1.
94
Id. (quoting 2017 Mass. Acts 55).
95
Id. at 2.
96
An even worse outcome could be too many “loopholes” that predatory investors could take
advantage of. See generally Morgan Fox, Looking Back On Ten Years Of Cannabis Reform—The Road

Behind, The Struggle Ahead, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N (Aug. 20, 2019), https://thecannabisindustry.org/

looking-back-on-ten-years-of-cannabis-reform-the-road-behind-the-struggle-ahead (“State and local
restorative justice efforts have had limited success, to put it generously. Funds intended for community
reinvestment have been diverted or delayed, and equity programs are sometimes being exploited by
predatory operators.”).
97
Guidance on Equity Programs, supra note 80; see Guidance on Licensure, CANNABIS CONTROL
COMM’N MASS. 5 (Jan 2020), https://mass-cannabis-control.com/wp-content/uploads/200825_Guidance
_on_Licensure.pdf.
98
Guidance on Equity Programs, supra note 80, at 5.
99
Id.
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exclusively available for SEP participants, which incentivizes partnerships
and reduces the likelihood of monopoly.100 Moreover, the CCC seems to be
continuously working with SEP participants to provide ongoing resources and
adjust the program when needed.101 However, while Massachusetts appears
to have a “good” program, it is still in its early stages; thus, it remains to be
seen whether the desired impact will be felt and whether the program is
sustainable.
2. Illinois
Regarded by many in the industry as one of “the most forwardthinking” and “the most comprehensive social equity program[s]” in the
United States, Illinois cannabis regulators drew from other states to draft
social equity regulations “to foster diversity in cannabis business ownership”
in the state.102 Unfortunately, because “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic has
slowed the program’s rollout,” it has yet to be seen if the program—which
looks so promising on paper—will live up to its hype in practice.103 Like
Massachusetts, Illinois’s social equity initiative addresses three main
categories:
(1) The applicant originates from an under-resourced area or
one disproportionately impacted by the war on drugs.
(2) The applicant or a family member of the applicant was
directly impacted by police enforcing anti-marijuana laws.
(3) The applicant hires 51% of employees from a distressed
neighborhood negatively affected by the war on drugs.104
While no licenses have been issued due to delays caused by COVID-19, those
who qualify for social equity consideration are expected to score well,
especially since “the social equity component of the application . . . accounts
for 25% of the total score.”105
Critics of the Illinois program have expressed concern that it will not
effectively promote diversity to the level that is desired.106 Learning lessons
from lawsuits brought in other states, like Pharmacann, the social equity
policies for Illinois did not designate “a certain number of licenses . . . [to] go
to people based on race.”107 While this seems positive on its face, it does not
100

See id.
See id.
102
Schaneman, supra note 74.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.; see also Steffen, supra note 91. At the time of writing, the world was still in the throes of the
COVID-19 virus pandemic which rocked the socioeconomic climate on a global scale; the true positive
and negative impact of the pandemic on the cannabis industry is yet unknown.
106
Schaneman, supra note 74.
107
Id.
101
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directly promote diversity when Black applicants “don’t qualify for social
equity because they’ve never been arrested and don’t live in distressed
neighborhoods.”108
The benefits of the program seem to be impactful and sustainable
since “[s]ocial equity applicants can . . . apply for a low-interest loan to assist
with the expenses of starting and operating a marijuana business as part of the
Social Equity Cannabis Business Development Fund.”109 Additionally,
similar to the exclusive license types available in Massachusetts, Illinois has
a “limited-license market,” which means that, in a competitive environment
where only so many licenses are awarded, “social equity applicants who do
win permits should be able to succeed financially.”110 Because of the limited
licenses and delays in the rollout, it is probable that the Illinois market will
not become “oversaturated for some time,” making it slightly easier for those
with licenses to seek capital from investors.111
B. The Bad: Ineffective and Unconstitutional Programs
Other states like Ohio and Colorado, discussed below, have made
relatively anemic attempts to promote social equity within the cannabis
industry.112 After embarking on hasty and overbroad laws that were struck
down, most states now take a very slow and cautious approach to developing
social equity programs.113
Unfortunately, this trepidation, however
thoughtful and tactical, is counterproductive to promoting equity and
inclusivity when the industry is exploding at such a breakneck pace.114
Though it is reasonable to take time to carefully draft social equity provisions,
the existing industry is moving full-steam ahead, leaving social equity
participants waiting in the wings, seemingly indefinitely.
1. Ohio
As discussed in the Introduction, Ohio’s attempt at a social equity
program was flawed from the start and doomed to fail in its infancy. 115
108

Id.
Id.
110
Id. More simply put, based on the author’s experience, when the licenses are scarce, more investors
will be interested in the fewer players, making it potentially easier for those who do hold licenses to seek
capital contributions.
111
Id.
112
See discussion infra Sections B.1–2.
109

113
Minutes, MED. MARIJUANA ADVISORY COMM. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.medicalmarijuana.ohio.gov/
Documents/advisory-committee/Meeting%20Materials/2020-12%20(November)/Meeting%20Minutes.pdf

(last visited May 30, 2022) (one of many instances where social equity still has not been brought into the
discussion). Due to delays in Illinois and Missouri as well as Ohio’s approach, no further plans appear
to be in the works for social equity.
114
See generally Hoban, supra note 5; Sagiv Galai, Equity Must Be at the Heart of Marijuana
Legalization, AM. C.L. UNION (June 26, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-lawreform/drug-law-reform/equity-must-be-heart-marijuana-legalization.
115
Mikos, supra note 9.
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Indeed, the state’s obligation to comply with the Code was dismissed
before the second wave of processor licenses could be awarded.116
Nonetheless, even if the program had survived the Pharmacann action,
benefits to participants were not included within the provisions of the
Ohio Revised Code.117 While hopeful applicants relied upon the Code’s
guarantee that minorities would hold a statutory minimum of all cannabis
business licenses in Ohio, the carve-out based on race did not account for any
additional benefits.118 Unlike other states discussed herein, Ohio’s initial
attempt at social equity lacked a plan for impact and long-term
sustainability.119 Unlike Illinois and Massachusetts, Ohio did not establish a
distinct committee to provide ongoing resources and oversight of its plans for
inclusion.120 Moreover, based on lawsuits brought in other states, many
should have known that the Ohio legislation with the race-based carve-out
was doomed to fail.121
2. Colorado
As one of the first states to legalize adult-use cannabis, Colorado’s
cannabis industry is often looked to as an example of the best (and worst)
practices other states can look to when modeling their own programs.122
As such, the Colorado cannabis industry has long been criticized for its
116
See discussion supra notes 3–11. Chapter 3796.09(C) of the Ohio Revised Code was enacted on
September 8, 2016. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.09. Applications were due on a rolling basis according
to license type on June 16, 2017 (Level II Cultivator), June 30, 2017 (Level I Cultivator),
November 17, 2017 (Dispensary), and December 15, 2017 (Processor). See generally Marijuana
Businesses, OHIO MED. MARIJUANA CONTROL PROGRAM, https://www.medicalmarijuana.ohio.gov/
cultivation (last visited May 30, 2022). Level II and Level I tiers of cultivation licenses were awarded on
November 3, 2017, and November 30, 2017, respectively, and the first round of processor licenses was
awarded on August 3, 2018. Id. The Pharmacann ruling was decided on November 15, 2018, abolishing
the social equity carve-out provision; and the second and final rounds of processor licenses were awarded
on January 9, 2019. Id.; see supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. Finally, Dispensary Licenses were
awarded on June 4, 2018. See generally Marijuana Businesses, OHIO MEDICAL MARIJUANA CONTROL
PROGRAM, https://www.medicalmarijuana.ohio.gov/cultivation (last visited May 30, 2022). Qualifying
for the Social Equity program means applicants may have spent more than two years from the promulgation
of the rules creating a business plan and preparing, submitting, and waiting on application results only to
learn that they were not going to benefit from the program.
117
See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.09.
118
Id.; OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3796:2-1-01.
119
Carrie Ghose, Led by Responsible Ohio backers, rejected medical marijuana cultivator applicants
sue, seeking to scrap licenses and re-score, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Feb. 20, 2018, 4:23 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/2018/02/20/led-by-responsible-ohio-backers-rejectedmedical.html/.
120
Id.; see Guidance on Equity Programs, supra note 80, discussion supra section A.2 and
accompanying footnotes.
121
See generally Erin Cox, Maryland medical marijuana regulators sued for not considering racial
diversity of license winners, BALT. SUN (Oct. 31, 2016, 8:25 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/
maryland/bs-md-marijuana-diversity-lawsuit-20161031-story.html; Robert McCoppin, New lawsuit
challenges Illinois medical marijuana license for Will Co., CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-medical-marijuana-grower-suit-met20150311-story.html.
122
See Bertie Song, Colorado’s Gold Standard for the New Legal States, NEW FRONTIER DATA
ANALYSTS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://newfrontierdata.com/cannabis-insights/colorados-gold-standard-newlegal-states/.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/8

2022]

Social Equity in the Cannabis Industry

359

conspicuous lack of diversity and social equity measures.123 In 2019,
Colorado passed legislation that created two new categories of marijuana
business licenses: accelerator cultivators and accelerator manufacturers.124
To secure an accelerator license, a person must have resided in a census tract
designated by the Colorado Office of Economic Development and
International Trade as an Opportunity Zone for “at least fifteen years between
the years 1980 and 2010 . . . .”125 Opportunity Zones are designated lowincome communities; investment in these communities receives favorable
federal tax treatment under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.126 The
accelerator license allows the licensee to work out of an established marijuana
cultivator or manufacturer’s premises.127 In addition, the established
business, which is referred to as the “Accelerator-Endorsed Licensee,” can
provide technical and capital support to the accelerator licensee.128 For most
of Colorado’s cannabis licenses, individuals with a felony conviction cannot
apply for a license within three years of their conviction or while subject to
a sentence, including any associated probation or parole.129 However,
a cannabis conviction cannot be the sole basis for denial of the accelerator
licenses.130
Additionally, in June of 2020, “An Act” formally addressing social
equity for cannabis in Colorado was finally adopted.131 However, the
program has been met with some harsh criticism as being “too little, too
late.”132 This is because it appears that the social equity regulations went into
effect well after the market had matured significantly; as such, it seems
doubtful that even the savviest of entrepreneurs could have an impact with
such a late entry into the industry. Therefore, while it is a welcome and longsought-after action, Colorado’s social equity measures seem relatively
impotent when compared to states that developed their social equity programs
in lockstep with the regulatory structure.
123

See Harris & Martin, supra note 32, at 11 (footnote omitted).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 44-10-607, 608.
125
Id. at § 44-10-308(4)(c)(I).
126
Id.
127
Id. at § 44-10-103(1)–(4.5).
128
Id. at § 103(2).
129
COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-10-307(1)(g)(I).
130
Id.
131
Id. at §§ 44-10-103, 307.
132
Colorado, as one of the first legal markets, was legalized by the voters as a constitutional
amendment and thus had no guidance from other jurisdictions; most importantly, Colorado had no (or very
little) guidance on the issue of social equity. Song, supra note 122. Some argue that the state’s population
significantly lacks diversity compared to some of the other jurisdictions discussed herein, and thus the lack
of diversity is reflected accordingly. See, e.g., Tiney Ricciardi, Denver’s marijuana businesses lack
diversity in ownership and employment, city study finds, DENVER POST (June 9, 2020, 8:04 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/08/denver-marijuana-cannabis-industry-racial-diversity/.
However, many, namely Wanda James, the first Black dispensary owner in the United States, vehemently
reject this argument. Bart Schaneman, Study: Denver cannabis companies mostly white-owned, lacking
social equity, MJBIZDAILY (June 10, 2020), https://mjbizdaily.com/study-denver-cannabis-companiesmostly-white-owned-lacking-social-equity/.
124
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Importantly, many of Colorado’s social equity program’s
shortcomings are belied by the municipal structure of its overall program,
which allows certain municipalities to either “opt-in” or develop unique
legislation.133 This structure leaves much of the overall program in the hands
of local governments, including any social equity efforts. This oversight, in
turn, begets an arguably biased patchwork of “dry municipalities” who refuse
to participate in the program and similarly varied social equity initiatives
rather than a statewide program with statewide oversight and administration.
C. The Ugly: Hard Truths and Important Takeaways from the Current
Landscape of Social Equity within the Cannabis Industry
The ugly side of social equity programs refers to a lack of due
diligence and proper oversight of operations once the respective social equity
program is underway.
1. Expectations vs. Reality
One predominant issue for social equity programs is the tension
between how the programs were intended to function and how the programs
actually function in practice over both the day-to-day and the long-term.
For example, the professional training and technical assistance services to
support SEP participants are provided by vendors who are selected as part of
a state procurement process.134 The vendors must submit comprehensive
proposals and be thoroughly vetted before a contract is awarded.135 While
this seems like a sensible, effective process for providing SEP and EEP
participants with professional training materials, resources, and advisors, the
actual benefit to participants has been inconsistent and minimal when
compared to the extensive requirements and steep learning curve for virtually
inexperienced aspiring business owners.136 Then to exacerbate the situation,
there is apparently little incentive for the approved vendors to consistently
or continuously provide support.137 Many businesses applied to assist
133
Tiney Ricciardi, What is social equity in Colorado’s cannabis industry? Regulators look to level
the playing field for marginalized communities, DENVER POST (Jan. 30, 2020, 10:43 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/01/30/social-equity-colorado-cannabis/.
134
Equity Programs, supra note 85.
135
See Alexander Lekhtham, Massachusetts Advances Its Unique Cannabis Social Equity Program,
FILTER (July 26, 2019), https://filtermag.org/massachusetts-cannabis-equity/.
136
This information was gleaned from the author’s interactions with clients.
137
See, e.g., Chris Nani et al., Understanding Social Equity, CANNABIS L. REP. 57,
https://cannabislaw.report/new-publication-social-equality-by-chris-nani/ (last visited May 30, 2022).
“‘It is the hardest thing I have ever had to do,’ says Jeff Bellino, co-founder of Hidden Hemlock alongside
his brother Greg Bellino, who were applicants in the microbusiness program.” Id. Bellino stated,
“As someone who has spent much of my professional engineering career literally writing license
applications and licensing approvals, these last three and a half years [spent applying for the microbusiness
license] have been trying.” Id. Furthermore, from the author’s experience, vendors or potential partners
and consultants are reluctant to provide support to social equity businesses without a tangible benefit in
return, such as payment or co-ownership in the licensed business. This is probably understandable; a gratis
initial consultation is costly to the providing vendor and thus feels generous from their perspective, but in
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participants in the program by providing discounted or pro bono services as
part of a “Positive Impact Plan”; however, they merely provided a single,
short consultation at no cost or presented a general overview of their
expertise, and then considered their “Plan” fulfilled.138 This “service” falls
far short of actually meeting the needs of SEP and EEP Participants who want
to become licensed and operate a business in a highly competitive, highly
regulated industry.
2. Providing Opportunity vs. Predatory Opportunism
Underinformed or misinformed advisory committees and regulators
who are not careful to expressly define certain “checks” on the social equity
participants’ qualification and ownership criteria may create a situation that
leaves participants vulnerable. Often, certain “loopholes” in the legislation
that governs the transfer of ownership can lead to “strawman” owners and
“shell” companies that result in predatory contracts.139 For example, limiting
the ability of social equity applicants to sell their businesses to non-equity
applicants limits the pool of potential buyers of their business enterprise.140
More specifically, Colorado’s “accelerator” model may create an
environment ripe for predatory opportunism.141 Such a model puts accelerator
licensees in a position where they are dependent on the bigger businesses to
act as endorsers; thus, the accelerator licensees may never fully realize
independent ownership.142 Similarly, other models create this potential for
predatory opportunism in other areas. In Illinois, “[a]pplicants can score
points for hiring 51% of the company’s employees from a disproportionately
impacted area, which could easily be misused if the workers aren’t paid well
or given prominent positions in the company.”143
Another substantial hurdle that most social equity applicants in the
cannabis industry face is “a lack of access to capital.”144 As cannabis
continues to be federally illegal, most banks in the United States are reluctant
to work with licensed cannabis businesses “for fear of being shut down by the
federal government.”145 Thus, cannabis entrepreneurs are without access to
traditional banking products and services, leaving them to “self-fund or
borrow money from their friends, family, or other sources,” unlike a typical
reality, one free consultation does little to support incoming program entrants over the long term.
Contrastingly, it seems unreasonable to expect vendors and others to provide continuous services and
expertise without payment or ownership stake in the business.
138
MCBA Determines that Los Angeles’ Social Equity Program Falls Short of Goals, MINORITY
CANNABIS BUS. ASS’N (June 27, 2019), https://minoritycannabis.org/mcba-determines-that-los-angelessocial-equity-program-falls-short-of-goals/.
139
See id.
140
COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-10-103(68.5).
141
See id. at (1)–(2).
142
Id.
143
See Schaneman, supra note 74.
144
Id.
145
Shu-Acquaye, supra note 12, at 39.

Published by eCommons, 2022

362

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

startup or small business.146 In turn, “given the inherent [racial] gaps in
wealth, ownership, and credit building,” this lack of access to financial
resources has a disparate effect on minorities attempting to own and operate
a cannabis business.147
3. A Colorblind Eye Turned on Impact and Sustainability
Implementing an effective social equity and inclusion strategy must
address the tensions between promoting diversity and access to resources for
marginalized groups while simultaneously maintaining a sense of
“colorblindness” and long-term viability. As Dr. Tiffany Bowden, an expert
in diversity and inclusion, has expressed:
[M]y experiences with my former companies helped me
understand that while we talk about people getting into the
cannabis industry, people do not discuss what happens to us
when we are here. Many cannabis companies are so small
that they are not regulated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Women are at risk and
Minorities too, are being used as props in social equity
programs and these businesses are being taken from them or
manipulated.148
Dr. Bowden’s experience reflects the harsh truth underpinning the current
climate of social equity programs in cannabis: it is not working, not yet.
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR OHIO AND BEYOND

It is possible that a more thorough preparation of their case and a few
tweaks to the defendant’s argument could have convinced a slightly more
compassionate judge to decide the Pharmacann case differently. But, with
the present issues and tension surrounding the conflict between state and
federal law, the judiciary is, as evidenced by the Pharmacann case, hesitant
to endorse certain social equity programs wholeheartedly.149 Therefore,
as Ohio prepares to institute an adult-use commercial cannabis program, it is
worthwhile to consider a “new and improved” social equity program to
include in the initiative.
The proposed program is designed with consideration to specific
elements described herein so as to avoid strict scrutiny review altogether.
However, with such a program, should strict scrutiny be applied, the Ohio
146

Id.
Id.
148
Warren Bobrow, 5 Inclusive Questions For Cannabis Diversity Educator Dr. Tiffany Bowden,
FORBES (Sept. 14, 2020, 9:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/warrenbobrow/2020/09/14/5-inclusivequestions-for-cannabis-diversity-educator-dr-tiffany-bowden/#2aed8b5a209d.
149
See Pharmacann Ohio, LLC, v. Ohio Dept. Com. Dir. Jacqueline T. Williams, No. 17-CV-10962,
2018 WL 7500067, at *10 (Ohio Com. Pl. Nov. 15, 2018).
147
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government could likely provide a “strong basis in evidence” that the program
was “narrowly tailored” in such a way as to justify the state’s “compelling”
interest in fostering a diverse and inclusive commercial cannabis industry.150
First, the legislation must be drafted with substantial consideration given to
demographic research and impact studies.151 Second, based on progress in
states like Massachusetts and Illinois, where a multi-faceted qualification
structure is applied to social equity participants, Ohio should not limit its
qualification criteria to race alone.152 Finally, measures for sustainability
should be implemented in such a way so that their long-term impact can be
monitored and the program can be modified accordingly.
A. Creating a “strong basis in evidence” by conducting demographic
research and impact studies.
We as a society may be able to accept that people are differently
impacted by socioeconomic and systemic marginalization; however, before
the judiciary, these accepted principles must be substantiated with factual
evidence. States that have conducted research on socioeconomic, cultural,
and historical backgrounds of different areas have drafted more targeted
legislation attempting to address community needs and disparities directly.153
As Ohio develops its new program, conducting thorough research as part of
the process will better inform the scope and goals of its new legislation.154
One possible way to do this is to create “heat maps” used to indicate
concentrated areas of the state’s populace that experience various forms of
disparity.155 States could model their research on a similar analysis conducted

150

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
For example, at the request of the Maryland Governor, economist Gail Rand conducted a disparate
impact study and provided a report on the demographics of the state to better inform its development of a
program to target specific communities as individuals based on the intersection of multiple socioeconomic, race, gender, and geographic factors. See Letter from Jon Wainwright, Managing Dir., Nat’l.
Econ. Rsch. Assoc. to R. Earl Lewis, Jr., Deputy Sec’y, Md. Dep’t. of Transp. (Jan. 17, 2018)
https://mmcc.maryland.gov/Documents/2018DisparityStudyforMDCannabisIndustry.pdf (describing
demographic research concerning minority-owned businesses); see also Sara Berg, Targeting COVID-19
inequities requires a data-driven approach, AM. MED. ASS’N (May 29, 2020), https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/health-equity/targeting-covid-19-inequities-requires-data-driven-approach; infra
note 154 and accompanying text.
152
See supra note 3–1313 and accompanying text; see also Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Massachusetts
marijuana dispensary association withdraws lawsuit against state delivery rules after backlash from
members,
BOSTON.COM
(Jan.
25,
2021),
https://www.boston.com/news/localnews/2021/01/25/massachusetts-marijuana-dispensary-delivery-lawsuit-backlash (the Massachusetts
Cannabis Association for Delivery lawsuit which was retracted after public outcry); see supra Discussion
II.A.1 and II.A.2.
153
See Comparison of State Cannabis Social Equity Provisions, supra note 74 (discussing how
Massachusetts, California, and Oregon each implemented targeted Social Equity Programs).
154
See, e.g., supra note 151 and accompanying text; Sam Wolff, Cannabis Equity Survey and Analysis,
DEP'T OF FIN. & ADMIN. SERVICES, CONSUMER PROT. DIV. (Nov. 2019), http://www.seattle.gov/
documents/Departments/FAS/BusinessLicenseTax/Cannabis%20forum/CANNABIS-EQUITYSURVEY-ANALYSIS.pdf.
155
When (and Why) to use Heat Maps, DUNDAS BI, https://www.dundas.com/resources/blogs/bestpractices/when-and-why-to-use-heat-maps (last visited May 30, 2022).
151
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as part of the rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine.156 Under this model, specific
locations were targeted to receive and administer doses of the vaccine.157
The selected locations were those determined to be particularly high-risk
areas based on the potential to spread infection and lack of access to
healthcare resources.158 As applied to cannabis business social equity
programs, different criteria could be researched, reported, and illustrated to
indicate “hot zones” of concentrations of affected areas. Then, each heat map
could be overlaid to indicate the greatest concentrations of disparate impact
areas to determine where to focus targeted legislation.
B. Developing a “narrowly tailored,” multi-faceted qualification
structure.
Once the research is conducted and the targeted communities and
individuals are identified, the language of the overarching act, regulations,
and stated goals must be carefully drafted to reflect the program’s
intentions.159 As evidenced by the Pharmacann ruling, it seems important to
focus the enumerated qualifications for social equity programs beyond just
race to include clearly defined individuals and communities. The government
must be able to support, with evidence, that the identified groups that stand to
benefit are best suited to carry out its interest in implementing a diverse and
inclusive commercial cannabis industry that fosters social equity.
C. Providing evidence of a “compelling government interest” by
clearly defining, monitoring, and implementing measures for
sustainability.
As a nascent industry, the long-term efficacy and impact of social
equity programs have yet to be fully understood. In fact, at the time of
authorship, several states, including Illinois, Colorado, and Massachusetts,
had yet to award cannabis business licenses to qualified social equity
participants.160 Therefore, states may need to review and amend their
156
Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Massachusetts is ramping down its mass vaccine sites as rollout enters new
phase, BOSTON.COM (May 3, 2021), https://www.boston.com/news/coronavirus/2021/05/03/
massachusetts-vaccine-rollout-new-phase-mass-vax-sites-close/; COVID-19: Policies to Protect People
and Communities, URBAN INST. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.urban.org/features/covid-19-policiesprotect-people-and-communities#chapter-1; Steven Brown, The COVID-19 Crisis Continues to Have
Uneven Economic Impact by Race and Ethnicity, URBAN INST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.urban.org/
urban-wire/covid-19-crisis-continues-have-uneven-economic-impact-race-and-ethnicity
(“[T]racking
which households are most affected could assist local, state, and federal policymakers in targeting their
efforts and ensuring an equitable recovery for all Americans.”).
157
See DeCosta-Klipa, supra note 156 and accompanying text.
158
Id.
159
It is well established that the language of any particular legislation is the best evidence of the
legislature’s intent. Therefore, to avoid misinterpretation and misapplication, the language must be neither
too broad nor too restrictive to apply effectively.
160
See Steffen supra note 91 and supra note 103 and accompanying text for an explanation of some
delays cause by the COVID-19 pandemic; however, this knowledge is from the author’s first-hand
experience with clients.
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programs from time to time in order to ensure the program’s desired outcome
is being achieved. This seems especially important given the government’s
potential need to prepare a defense should a cause of action attacking the
constitutionality of the program be brought against it, as it was in
Pharmacann.161 If the government is able to lay the proper foundation for its
legislation and can provide ongoing evidence of the social equity program’s
ability to serve the government’s interest, then it should be able to provide
evidence that the program is sufficiently serving its interests.
To begin with, the state’s interest should be clearly defined in the
overarching language of the act. Some states, including Massachusetts and
Illinois, included language that articulates an overarching purpose of the
social equity program.162 While this language generally refers to an interest
in diversity, such as providing resources and reducing barriers to entry into
the industry for those who have experienced a disparate negative impact, in
other states, disparate impact alone may not be sufficient to justify
a “compelling government interest.”163 Therefore, it would seem that the
more specific a state can be in articulating its goals and its interests, the more
clearly it can conduct studies to determine whether the program, as written
and implemented, is achieving those goals.
Next, the state should develop a plan to monitor its progress toward
achieving its defined goals. One way to do this would be by conducting
regular surveys, audits, reports, and reviews. For example, once a state’s
social equity program becomes operational with active licensees, a 90-day
follow-up survey could be administered to the participants. In fact, a few
states have administered ongoing surveys to representatives of participants in
social equity programs at the conclusion of the application process and startup
process.164 The survey asked a number of questions relating to the client’s
experience in terms of what worked well and what did not.165 The apparent
goal is to use this data to inform social equity lobbying and advocacy efforts
with legislators in the state.166 It, therefore, seems that similar surveys and
reviews could be conducted as part of the state’s program responsibilities.
Thereafter, adjustments could be made based on the feedback, and after public
comment, measures could be amended as appropriate.
Finally, it is likely that providing evidence of both the immediate and
long-term benefits and overall impact on the community would be useful in
161
Causes of action have been brought in almost every state with a regulated commercial cannabis
program, especially those early programs with social equity measures.
162
See supra notes 83, 102 and accompanying text.
163
The Pharmacann case is an example where the government’s defense, which included research of
the disparate impact on minorities and the desire to promote an inclusive industry, was not convincing
to the court. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
164
See Wolff, supra note 153.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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showing that the state’s social equity program is carrying out its intended
purpose. Short-term benefits may include the addition of jobs and commerce
to the local community and the state overall. Thus, in states where the social
equity programs include access to startup funding, educational resources, and
training, communities and the state overall could potentially realize
a significant boost to their economy.167
States may also decide to allocate tax revenue derived from
commercial cannabis to other impactful public programs. For example:
When Illinois legalized recreational marijuana, the state
created the Restore, Reinvest and Renew Program, which
allocates 25% of cannabis tax revenue to fund grants for
violence prevention, economic development and other efforts
in parts of the state that are “found to be acutely suffering
from the horrors of violence” and related problems.168
Colorado and Massachusetts have similar programs in place as well.169
In fact, in 2019, the Colorado Department of Revenue counted over
$302 million in cannabis tax revenue, “nearly a 12 percent bump over
2018’s total of $266.5 million.”170 Out of that tax revenue, “the first
$40 million . . . is distributed to the state’s Public School Capital Construction
Assistance Fund, . . . [and the e]xtra marijuana excise tax revenue then goes
to the state’s general public school fund . . . .”171
An additional benefit may be that communities see a reduction in
crime rates, both cannabis-related and otherwise. To this point, most licensed
cannabis facilities are equipped with sophisticated security systems and tend
to increase the presence of law enforcement and security officers in the
area.172 Furthermore, states with programs for legal cannabis have seen
a reduction in opioid addiction and overdose fatality rates.173

167
For a discussion of the impact of discrimination and the economy, see Adeyo Akala, Cost Of
Racism: U.S. Economy Lost $16 Trillion Because Of Discrimination, Bank Says, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020,
2:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/09/23/916022472/
cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-bank-says.
By implementing
programs specially designed to promote diversity, the economy can flourish like never before. Id.
168
See Schaneman, supra note 74 (quoting Restore, Reinvest, and Review (R3) Program, ILL. JUST.
PROJECT, https://www.iljp.org/r3program (last visited May 30, 2022)).
169
See Christy Bieber, Marijuana Tax Revenue: A State-by-State Breakdown, MOTLEY FOOL
(Aug. 3, 2021, 3:58 PM), https://www.fool.com/research/marijuana-tax-revenue-by-state/.
170
Thomas Mitchell, Record Sales Bring New High to Marijuana Tax Revenue, WESTWORLD
(Jan. 28, 2020, 8:27 AM), https://www.westword.com/marijuana/record-marijuana-sales-in-coloradobring-new-high-to-tax-revenue-11621939.
171
Id.
172
See e.g., Derek Arcuri, Cannabis Industry: A Growth Sector for Security Professionals, SECURITY
(May 13, 2020), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92179-cannabis-industry-a-growth-sectorfor-security-professionals.
173
See Nina Lincoff, States with Legal Marijuana See 25 Percent Fewer Prescription Painkiller
Deaths, HEALTHLINE, https://www.healthline.com/health-news/states-with-legal-marijuana-have-feweroverdose-deaths-082614#1 (Oct. 20, 2018).
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CONCLUSION

Designing and implementing a program based upon the foregoing
measures will potentially provide access to opportunity and foster inclusion
in the commercial cannabis industry in an impactful way. More importantly,
a program like the one outlined above could be tailored in other states to
specifically identify and direct positive impact on those individuals and
communities who have been most disproportionately harmed by the failed
“War on Drugs.” Built upon a research-driven foundation and derived from
objective data, such a program would almost certainly stand up to scrutiny in
a court of law.174
The time is ripe for an ethically and intellectually honest, holistic
approach to social equity in cannabis. These programs should be focused on
providing overdue opportunities instead of loopholes for the opportunistic.
With an analytical and pragmatic approach, it is possible to develop and
implement a program that will have the desired impact while complying with
state law and constitutional requirements. Even beyond the state of Ohio, we,
as a nation, have a rare opportunity in the early days of this new booming
industry. We get to acknowledge our shortcomings and how we have
exacerbated harm in our most vulnerable and marginalized communities;
then, we get to do the work to fix the system. Under the foregoing proposed
model, wrongs can begin to be made right, promoting a diverse, inclusive,
and economically thriving cannabis industry.

174
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 781 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); discussion supra Section III.
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